He is the son of a great religious icon and a popular leader of a guerrilla army that was fighting against a foreign occupier with entire entire regions carrying his banner. So how did the United States manage to defeat him? He is Muqtada al-Sadr, son of a famous Iraqi Shiite cleric that was murdered by the evil Saddam Hussein, who created a fearsome guerrilla army that was ultimately defeated by US troops and the new Iraqi armed forces.

The United States, known around the world for being unable to fight protracted guerrilla wars like Vietnam, was able to do in the 21st century what it could not do in the 60’s and 70’s: defeat a popular guerrilla army. For the record though, in Vietnam the US military won every single battle and undeniably devastated the enemy through superior performance and superior technology even though we were outnumbered and in difficult terrain. In the end, the US government, under extreme political pressure, decided to withdraw from the conflict and let the South Vietnamese take care of their own country resulting in what we wanted to prevent: the communist takeover of the South. The reasons for one unsuccessful and another successful engagement is complicated and involves the politics of each time period, the different terrain, the different strategies employed by both sides, and differences in the sheer number of participants. What this conflict teaches us is that the United States military can adjust to urban combat, recruit local support, and be successful.

First, the Mahdi army was Sadr’s militia which formed a sort of government running parallel to the recently established Iraqi government. They took care of the security of Sadr city (a Baghdad district) and some other southern majority-Shiite cities. In 2004, the Mahdi army started on offensive across various cities and clashed with coalition forces (US, British, and Iraqi security forces). The militia was beaten back, but the Mahdi army did enjoy some success early on in their campaign. What ensued was an on again off again guerrilla war between the Mahdi army and Coalition troops that eventually culminated in an all out crackdown on the Mahdi army throughout Iraq. Coalition forces fought the Mahdi army in Basra and, in its first major operation, the Iraqi security forces (with US support) pushed into Sadr city. Sadr ordered a cease-fire last year and the Mahdi army has ceased its guerrilla operations since.

Throughout the entire conflict, Sadr was given the choice to join the political process if he disarmed and in fact was very successful in creating a political bloc in the Iraqi parliament. Some called this appeasement, but in what was essentially a civil war, to adopt a strategy that excluded them from politics and tried to capture or kill them would have been the equivalent of kicking and imprisoning out all southern governors, congressmen, and judges after the US Civil War. That just could not realistically happen. The success of coalition forces can therefore be attributed to three major accomplishments: sustained military crackdown of Mahdi army, political inclusion in exchange for ending violence, and limited collateral damage. The last one is very important, since an unrestrained campaign against Sadr resulting in the deaths of too many innocent Iraqis would have strengthened the Sadr organization. The other two is classic carrot-and-stick which worked well and, in a sense, Sadr’s decision to reorient his organization towards politics may have backfired since his brand of sectarianism seems to have been rejected by the electorate already weary of dictatorship and bloodshed.

Of course, this is not the end of Muqtada al-Sadr. Reports are that he is currently engaging in religious study in Iran with aspirations to become Ayatollah, a designation that will make it a religious obligation to follow his edicts for many Shiites. Eventually he is expected to return and, with the Ayatollah title, may become even more powerful politically than he ever was militarily.

What this episode in American history teaches us is that victory requires the smart application of power, not mere words, not mere dialogue, and definitely not appeasement. Had the coalition forces merely tried to negotiate with Sadr instead of actively neutralizing his faction throughout the whole of Iraq, then we would still be dealing with high levels of violence against our troops over there. More importantly, it shows the American military that we can confront an enemy that uses guerrilla tactics and win.

So I ask myself: if we can win this type of war, why are there people in Washington that are so eager to declare defeat and retreat as quickly as possible? Why did Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid rush to declare the war “lost” instead of working to win it? Why are we entertaining the thought of negotiating with the enemy when we should simply be dictating our terms?

The illogic of the far left is astounding. We need to restore intelligent and courageous leadership in America.

-AG